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INTRODUCTION
During recent oral arguments in Peruta v. County of San Diego, a case being
reconsidered en banc in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
former Solicitor General Paul Clement turned to what may appear an unusual
guide for interpreting the scope of the Second Amendment in the twenty-first
century. His clients had been denied permits to carry concealed handguns in
San Diego because they could not demonstrate a heightened need for self-
defense, and Clement was trying to convince the Ninth Circuit that the Second
Amendment precluded those denials. Two of the strongest sources of
authority -decisions by other federal appellate courts and evidence from the
period of the Second Amendment's adoption -provided scant support for his
position. In fact, several courts recently upheld "good cause" policies similar to
San Diego's,1 and firearm regulations, including those prohibiting discharge in
populated areas, were common in the Founding era.2 Instead, Clement looked
to antebellum state court case law, and referred the Ninth Circuit to the
interpretation of the Second Amendment from an 1846 opinion by the Georgia
Supreme Court, Nunn v. State.3 The Georgia high court held that the Second
1. See Drake v. Fillco, 7 24 F. 3 d 4 26, 434 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 7 12 F. 3d 865, 881
(4 th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cry. of Westchester, 701 F. 3 d 81, iot (2d Cir. 2o2). But see
Moore v. Madigan, 7o2 F. 3 d 933 (7 th Cir. 2o2) (striling down a total ban on public carry
without ruling on the constitutionality of less restrictive "good cause" policies like San
Diego's).
2. Among other things, laws restricted the way gunpowder could be stored, and several cities -
including Boston, Philadelphia, New York City, and Newport- restricted the use of
firearms in public. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 683-84 (2oo8) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (compiling laws).
3. See Oral Argument at it:5o, Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 1o-56971 (June 16, 2015),
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view video.php?pk vid-0000007886 [http://perma
.cc/DMK2-JDQA] (involing Nunn v. State, i Ga. 243 (1846)). By interpreting the Second
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Amendment protected the right "to keep and bear arms of every description"
and was violated by a law prohibiting the open carrying of certain weapons. 4
Clement argued that the Ninth Circuit should adopt Nunn's view of the
Second Amendment to strike down San Diego's "good cause" policy.5
Nunn, of course, is not binding precedent in the Ninth Circuit. But ever
since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in District of Columbia v. Heller
used an originalist approach to establish the individual right to keep and bear6
arms, courts have incorporated historical evidence into their Second
Amendment jurisprudence.7 This historical evidence includes Nunn and other
antebellum state court opinions.8 As Justice Scalia put it in his majority opinion
in Heller, "interpret[ations] of the Second Amendment in the century after its
enactment," including in state court opinions, are "a critical tool of
constitutional interpretation," since they can point to "the scope [constitutional
rights] were understood to have when the people adopted them."9 Indeed, as
Amendment as applicable to a Georgia state law, Nunn rejected the United States Supreme
Court's prior conclusion that the Bill of Rights did not constrain state governments. See
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). This was an early signal that Nunn was out of sync
with the national consensus at the time about an elemental aspect of constitutional law. See
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 153-56 (1998)
(describing Nunn as one of several "contrarian" opinions in conflict with Barron).
4. Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251 (emphasis omitted). In particular, Nunn held that Georgia was precluded
from prohibiting the open carrying of weapons, but could prohibit the concealed carrying of
weapons. Id. The argument advanced by the plaintiff in Peruta is similar: that San Diego
cannot prohibit the concealed carrying of firearms, given that the open carrying of firearms
is prohibited in much of the county.
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2615o(a)(2), 26155(a)(2) (2o12) (requiring concealed carry
applicants to prove "good cause"); id. § 26160 (maintaining that licensing authorities shall
publish written policies regarding "good cause" and other requirements); Peruta v. Cty. of
San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 11o6, 111o (S.D. Cal. 2OO) (describing the defendant's argument
that in San Diego "good cause" is a "set of circumstances that distinguishes the applicant
from other members of the general public and causes him or her to be placed in harm's
way").
6. 554 U.S. 570 (2oo8).
7. See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F. 3 d 1197, 1211 (loth Cir. 2013) (holding that to
determine whether a law impinges on the Second Amendment the court must ask "whether
the law harmonizes with the historical traditions associated with the Second Amendment
guarantee"); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives, 70o F. 3 d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (same); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F. 3 d
458, 470 (4 th Cir. 2o11) ("[H]istorical meaning enjoys a privileged interpretative role in the
Second Amendment context.").
8. See, e.g., Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F. 3d 1144, 1155-6o (9 th Cir. 2014), reh'g en banc
granted, 781 F. 3 d 11o6 (9 th Cir. 2o15); id. at 1185-89 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Drake, 724
F. 3d at 449-5o (Hardiman, J., dissenting); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F. 3 d 81,
9o-91 (2d Cir. 2012).
9. Heller, 554 U.S. at 6o5, 634-35.
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Clement noted, the Heller majority itself favorably cited Nunn's interpretation
of the Second Amendment.1"
But when courts invoke Nunn and other antebellum opinions about the
right to carry guns in public, they glance over a striking fact about the case law:
it is drawn almost exclusively from the slaveholding South. This regional link
raises two related questions. First, why did this case law arise in the antebellum
South, but not in other areas of the country? And second, did this regional
jurisprudence really reflect a national understanding of the Second
Amendment's scope? If Nunn and similar cases were the product of a unique
regional culture during a unique period in the nation's development, quite
removed from the Founding era (and the Reconstruction era)," they do not
provide a solid foundation for a contemporary interpretation of the Second
Amendment.12
This Essay begins to address these questions.13 First, it draws on the broad
body of historical research into the distinctive culture of slavery and honor in
1o. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 612 (quoting Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251); Oral Argument, supra note 3, at
ii:5o. The holding in Heller was limited to the scope of the Second Amendment right within
the home, which is why Heller's invocation of Nunn is not dispositive in cases like Peruta,
concerning the scope of the right outside the home.
ii. Some scholars, most prominently Akhil Reed Amar, argue that the understanding of the
Second Amendment at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment should
inform today's interpretation of the right to bear arms. See AMAR, supra note 3, at 257-66.
More recently, Amar has pointed to the existence of distinctive regional constitutional
subcultures. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: A GRAND TOUR OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC at xii (2o15) ("[O]ur common Constitution looks slightly
different from state to state and across the various regions of this great land."). Our analysis
builds on Amar's important observation regarding regionalism, as well as the exposition of
differing urban and rural firearm regulatory regimes in Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123
YALE L.J. 82 (2013). Several other notable papers addressing historical firearms regulations
that have been published recently by the Yale Law Journal include Darrell A.H. Miller, Text,
History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE
L.J. 852 (2013); Michael P. O'Shea, Why Firearm Federalism Beats Firearm Localism, 123 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 359 (2o14), http://yalelawjournal.org/foruniwhy-firearm-federalism-beats
-firearm-localism [http://perma.cc/XFX6-2B 9 R]; and Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry
forAll: Heller and Our Nine teenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486 (2014).
12. Cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 871 (2OO) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Liberty
claims that are inseparable from the customs that prevail in a certain region, the
idiosyncratic expectations of a certain group, or the personal preferences of their champions,
may be valid claims in some sense; but they are not of constitutional stature.").
13. We take no position in this Essay regarding whether courts should use originalism as the sole
means of constitutional interpretation, or which of several competing theories of originalism
ought to be the preferred method. On the current state of the debate regarding originalism,
see Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375
(2013).
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the antebellum South that contributed to both arms carrying and violence. 4
This culture also influenced jurisprudence throughout the region, including
the opinions of Chief Justice Joseph Henry Lumpkin, the author of Nunn.
Second, we contrast Nunn's view of the right to bear arms outside the home
with a separate historical tradition, dominant outside the South, which was less
enthusiastic about public carry and more tolerant of broad regulation of the
public bearing of arms. 5 In fact, the vast majority of Americans lived under this
alternative tradition, rather than under the Nunn regime. This analysis
suggests that Nunn and similar cases did not represent a national consensus
about the meaning of the right to bear arms, and should not be relied upon to
strike down public carry regulations today.
I. THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH AND THE ORIGINS OF PERMISSIVE
CARRY JURISPRUDENCE
Last year, when a split panel in Peruta declared San Diego's concealed carry
policy unconstitutional -prompting the Ninth Circuit to rehear the case en
banc-the majority rested its conclusion on an analysis of nineteenth-century
cases, including Nunn, from courts in nine states, all but one of them
Southern: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, North
Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.16 After reviewing these cases, the opinion for
14. For two notable studies relating to honor culture, slavery, and violence in the antebellum
South, see RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 18o-249 (2oo9), which discusses how
slavery, honor, and other regional differences contributed to higher homicide rates in the
slave South than the North; and BERTRAM WYATT-BRovN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS
AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH 362-401 (2007), which describes how violence was used
to preserve personal status in Southern honor culture.
15. In the era of Reconstruction, moreover, this alternative model grew stronger and included
large sections of the South. See infra notes 63- 69 and accompanying text.
16. In particular, the Peruta majority relied upon State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616-17 (1840); Wilson
v. State, 33 Ark. 557, 56o (1878); Stockdale v. State, 32 Ga. 225, 227 (1861); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga.
243 (1846); Walls v. State, 7 Black. 572, 573 (Ind. 1845); State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind.
1833); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822); State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399, 400
(1858); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (185o); State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418 (1843);
Andrews v. State, So Tenn. 165, 187 (1871); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840); Simpson v.
State, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356 (1833); and Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 403 (1859). See Perta
v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F. 3d 1144, 1156-6o (9 th Cir. 2014). The one non-Southern state in
this list is Indiana, whose early history was largely shaped by migrants from the South. As
historian Nicole Etcheson observes, "forty-four percent of Hoosiers" in 185o were
immigrants from the South. Nicole Etcheson, Manliness and the Political Culture of the Old
Northwest, 179o-186o, 15 J. EARLY REP. 59, 6o & n.2 (Spring 1995). The Peruta majority
acknowledged, but rejected, the following nineteenth century cases that did not support its
conclusion: Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564 (1882); Fife v. State, 31 Ark 455 (1876); Carroll v. State,
28 Ark. 99 (1872); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472 (1874); State v.
Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 459 (18 75); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872). See Peruta, 742 F. 3 d at 1156-
6o.
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the divided court concluded that "the majority of nineteenth century courts
agreed that the Second Amendment right extended outside the home and
included, at minimum, the right to carry an operable weapon in public for the
purpose of lawful self-defense.""
But the majority's presumption that this regional selection of case law
reflected a national jurisprudential consensus in the nineteenth century is
deeply problematic. The selective use of Southern case law in Peruta represents
just the type of analysis that Justice Scalia has warned against, in which courts
"look over the heads of the crowd and pick out [their] friends. ' '1S
Understanding this jurisprudence, to borrow again from Justice Scalia,
"requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the
time.., and putting on beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties
that are not those of our day."19 These cases did not emerge in a vacuum and
do not reflect the full range of American legal history. Rather, they come from
a time, place, and culture where slavery, honor, violence, and the public
carrying of weapons were intertwined.20
Violence was a central element of slave and honor culture in the South.
Richard Hildreth, an antebellum lawyer, journalist, and historian, wrote in
1840 that violence was frequently employed both to subordinate slaves and to
intimidate abolitionists.21 That violence, in turn, resulted in "a complete
paroxism [sic] of fear" and "extreme degree of terror. . . of slave vengeance"
amongst the slaveholding class.' Meanwhile, violence between white men "to
preserve white manhood and personal status" was encouraged in Southern
honor culture. 3 According to Hildreth, duels "appear but once an age" in the
17. Peruta, 742 F. 3 d at 116o.
18. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 36 (1997)
(paraphrasing Judge Harold Leventhal's criticism of the use of legislative history); see also
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
ig. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 5 7U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856-57 (1989).
20. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, "Never Intended to Be Applied to the White
Population": Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity -The Redeemed South's Legacy to a
National Jurisprudence?, 70 CH.-KENT. L. REV. 1307, 1314 (1995) (observing that, unlike in
the North, "the South's large population of slaves constituted a potential danger to the free
white population, a danger that had to be controlled"); id. at 1318-19 ("Almost from the
beginning, the unique need to maintain white domination in the nation's first truly multi-
racial society led the South to a greater vigor [than other regions] with respect to the private
possession of arms and to the universal depu[t]ization of the white population as a means of
insuring racial control.") (footnote omitted).
21. RIcHARD HILDRETH, DESPOTISM IN AMERICA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE, RESULTS, AND
LEGAL BASIS OF THE SLAVE-HOLDING SYSTEM 88 (1854).
22. Id. at 89-90.
23. See WYATT-BROVN, supra note 14, at 368-69.
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North, but "are of frequent and almost daily occurrence at the [S]outh."' As a
result of the distinct cultural phenomena of slavery and honor, Southern men
carried weapons both "as a protection against the slaves" and also to be
prepared for "quarrels between freemen."'
Hildreth was not the only contemporary commentator to observe the
prevalence of public carry in Southern society or to compare it with the norm
in other parts of the country. In 1845, one year before Nunn, New York jurist
William Jay contrasted "those portions of our country where it is supposed
essential to personal safety to go armed with pistols and bowie-knives" with
the "north and east, where we are unprovided with such facilities for taking
life. ' '26 Frederick Law Olmstead, writing in 1857, observed that "among young
men a bowie-knife was a universal, and a pistol a not at all unusual, companion
in Kentucky." ' 7 Similarly, an 1874 New York Times editorial commented that
"[i]n most of the Southern States, the keeping and bearing of arms is
considered an indispensable adjunct to the freedom of an American citizen. "8
The editorial continued: "When a mob assembles in a Southern State, it is
certain to be an 'armed mob.' The gun stores are among the largest and most
prosperous establishments in small Southern towns."2 9 In 188o, journalist
H.V. Redfield published one of the earliest studies exploring Southern violence
and concluded that the South's murder rate was connected to the prevalence of
public carrying of weapons, particularly concealable ones.3" In much of the
South, "[s]o fixedly has this deadly custom been engrafted upon society ...
that a very earnest and prolonged effort will be required to efface it."31 He
noted that in New England, however, carrying concealed weapons was
uncommon because "[t] he laws forbid it, and public sentiment condemns it so
24. See HILDRETH, supra note 21, at 145.
25. Id. at 9o; see also ROTH, supra note 14, at 218 ("Few whites had carried pistols or fighting
knives in the eighteenth century, but the practice became popular in the plantation South in
the nineteenth century as fears of black violence grew and whites became more anxious and
belligerent.").
26. WILLIAM JAY, ADDRESS BEFORE THE AMERICAN PEACE SOCIETYAT ITS ANNUAL MEETING 23-24
(1845).
27. FREDERICK LAW OLMSTEAD, A JOURNEY THROUGH TEXAS, OR, A SADDLE-TRIP ON THE
SOUTHWESTERN FRONTIER 20 (1857).
28. Editorial, A QuestionforArkansas, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1874, at 4.
29. Id.
30. H.V. REDFIELD, HOMICIDE, NORTH AND SOUTH: BEING A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF CRIME
AGAINST THE PERSON IN SEVERAL PARTS OF THE UNITED STATES 197-98 (188o) ("If the habit
of carrying deadly weapons could be suppressed in the Southern States it would diminish
the number of homicides very largely."). By the time of Redfield's study, the Southern
homicide rates had been significantly higher than the Northern rates for at least sixty years.
By the 182os, Southern homicide rates were at least double that of the two "most homicidal"
Northern cities -New York and Philadelphia. See ROTH, supra note 14, at 2oo.
31. REDFIELD, supra note 30, at 195.
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strongly that were the laws silent the habit could not be engrafted upon
society."32
Public carry thus was popular in Southern society, but cultural norms were
not silent regarding what manner of carrying was honorable. In particular,
concealed carry was perceived to give men "secret advantages" and lead to
"unmanly assassinations," while open carry "place[d] men upon an equality"
and "incite[d] men to a manly and noble defence of themselves. '33 Some
Southern legislatures, accordingly, passed laws penalizing concealed carry,
while permitting open carry. Kentucky and Louisiana passed the first such laws
in 1813, and other states followed suit.'
The challenges to these laws gave rise to the Nunn family of case law.
Following the norms of the time, Southern judges wrote opinions supporting
open carry as constitutionally protected, while criticizing concealed carry and
noting that it was constitutionally unprotected. 35 No similar judicial record
exists in the North, meanwhile, where public carry was much less prevalent
and public carry restrictions appear to have gone unchallenged.36
32. Id. at 194.
33. See State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (185o) (stating that open carry "is calculated to
incite men to a manly and noble defence of themselves, if necessary, and of their country,"
but concealed carry tends "to secret advantages and unmanly assassinations").
34. See Act of Feb. 3, 1813, ch. 89, 1812 Ky. Acts loo; Act of Mar. 25, 1813, 1812 La. Acts 172; Act
of Feb. 1, 1839, No. 77, 1838 Ala. Laws 67; Act of Dec. 25, 1837, 1837 Ga. Laws 9o; Act of Feb.
10, 1831, ch. 26, § 58, 1831 Ind. Acts 18o, 192; Act of Jan. 14, 1820, ch. 23, 1819 Ind. Acts 39;
Act of Feb. 2, 1838, ch. 101, 1838 Va. Acts 76; REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF ARIANSAS,
ADOPTED AT THE OCTOBER SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF SAID STATE, A.D. 1837, at
28o (William MoK. Ball & Sam C. Roane eds., 1838) (including "[w]earing concealed
weapons" in its list of "offences against the public peace, and affecting the security of
persons and property" in ch. 44, div. VIII, art. I, § 13).
35. See, e.g., Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 489-9o. Nunn based its holding on the Second Amendment,
while other Southern courts relied upon provisions in their state constitutions. To be sure,
the broad view of the right to bear arms was not universally held in the South. But
supporters of expansive public carry rights generally reject any contrary cases as not
surviving Heller. See, e.g., Peruta v. Cry. of San Diego, 742 F. 3 d 1144, 1159 (rejecting analysis
in State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842)); id. at 116o (rejecting analysis in State v. Duke, 42 Tex.
455 (1874)); see also Darrell A.H. Miller, Peruta, the Home-Bound Second Amendment, and
Fractal Originalism, 127 HARv. L. REv. F. 238, 239 (2014) (describing how "some . . .
precedent did not fit" with Heller's view of the right to bear arms and "[t]rimming was
therefore in order"). Today, concealed carrying is more popular than open carrying, and
accordingly gun rights advocates do not limit their arguments about the scope of the Second
Amendment to one preferred form of carrying.
36. See infra Part 11. We do not intend to suggest that violence or firearms carrying did not exist
in the north. They did exist, but to a much lesser extent. See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-
REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN
AMERICA 139 (2006) (discussing northern concerns about concealed carry).
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The judges deciding the Southern right-to-carry cases were thus immersed
in a social and legal atmosphere unique to the South.37 The distinctive nature
of Southern society, including its embrace of slavery and honor, contributed to
an aggressive gun culture. 8 That culture, in turn, influenced jurists such as
Chief Justice Lumpldn, who had considerable success "translating his personal
views into law."39 At minimum, the historical origins of Nunn and similar cases
ought to give modern judges serious pause as they consider public carry cases,
like Peruta, in the post-Heller era.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY TRADITION
Nunn's permissive view of public carry was not universally held in the
United States-indeed, it was not universally held in the South.40 Another
prevalent view accepted robust regulation of the right to carry. The roots of
this alternative framework can be traced to the regulatory regime of medieval
England. In 1328, the English Statute of Northampton began a tradition of
prohibiting armed travel through fairs, markets, and other populated areas.41
37. Some gun rights advocates have acknowledged as much. See, e.g., Cottrol & Diamond, supra
note 20, at 1318-23.
38. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
39. Mason W. Stephenson & D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., "To Protect and Defend": Joseph Henry
Lumpkin, the Supreme Court of Georgia, and Slavery, 25 EMORY L.J. 579, 579-80 (1976).
Indeed, one of Chief Justice Lumpkin's primary objectives was to preserve the hegemony of
the planter class and maintain the hierarchy that defined slave society. In an opinion just
two years after Nunn, he expressed his fear that freed slaves would endanger slaveholders:
"Neither humanity, nor religion, nor common justice, requires of us to sanction or favor
domestic emancipation; to give our slaves their liberty at the risk of losing our own." Vance
v. Crawford, 4 Ga. 445, 459 (1848). In another, he upheld the use of trained dogs to pursue a
runaway slave. Before quoting extensively from the New Testament regarding the coming
apocalypse, Chief Justice Lumpkin opined that such measures were necessary "to tighten the
chords that bind the negro to his condition of servitude -a condition which is to last...
until the end of time." Moran v. Davis, 18 Ga. 722, 724 (1855). Nunn, which struck down a
Georgia law that prohibited white citizens from openly carrying guns, is an especially weak
foundation for our modern, national jurisprudence, given Chief Justice Lumpkin's professed
interest in preserving the "peculiar institution," even if through the use of violence and
intimidation.
40. See, e.g., infra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of justices of the peace
to arrest those who "shall go or ride armed with unusual and offensive weapons... among
any great Concourse of the People" in North Carolina (quoting J. DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND
AUTHORITY OF AJUSTICE OF THE PEACE 13 (Newbern, James Davis 1774))).
41. 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 258 (mandating that
individuals "bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by
day, in [fjairs, [m]arkets, nor in the presence of the [j]ustices or other [m]inisters, nor in no
part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their [a]rmour to the King, and their [b]odies to prison
at the King's pleasure").
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Others have explored the evolution of this prohibition in England.' What is
important for this Essay is that several early American states expressly
incorporated versions of the Statute of Northampton into their laws.' In those
states, constables, magistrates, or justices of the peace had the authority to
arrest anyone who traveled armed contrary to prohibitions derived from the
Statute of Northampton. As a North Carolina jurist, James Davis, put it in
1774:
Justices of the Peace, upon their own View, or upon Complaint, may
apprehend any Person who shall go or ride armed with unusual and
offensive weapons, in an Affray, or among any great Concourse of the
People, or who shall appear, so armed, before the King's Justices sitting
in Court."
These types of restrictions on the right to bear arms were widely considered
permissible at the Founding.45
Modem proponents of an expansive right to public carry downplay this
early regulation, insisting, for example, that it only covered "arms carrying
with the specific intent of terrorizing the public.,, 6 This reading is partially due
to the fact that some early American versions of the Statute of Northampton,
exemplified by a 1790S Massachusetts law, gave justices of the peace the
authority to arrest "such as shall ride or go armed offensively, to the fear or terror
of the good citizens."'47 But as William Blackstone suggested in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, terrorizing the public was the
42. For a helpful exposition of how the Statute of Northampton evolved through the centuries,
see Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus
Ahistorical Standards ofReview, 6o CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 7-36 (2012).
43. See 1852 Del. Laws 330-33; 1795 Mass. Acts 436; 1821 Me. Laws 285; 1792 N.C. Sess. Laws
6o-61; 18oi Tenn. Pub. Acts 71o; 1786 Va. Acts 33.
44. See J. DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 13 (Newbern, James
Davis 1774) (citing Michael Dalton, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE CONTAINING THE PRACTICE,
DUTY AND POWER OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE AS WELL IN AS OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 37
(London 1705)).
45. See Charles, supra note 42, at 31-36 (describing the express adoption of similar prohibitions
in many parts of early America and the common understanding that these prohibitions
barred public carry to preserve the public peace).
46. David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State Standards of Review for the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms, So SANTA CLARAL. REv. 1113, 1127, 1133-34 (2OO); see also Peruta v. Cry. of San Diego,
742 F. 3 d 1144, 1154-55 (9 th Cir. 2014), rehg en banc granted, 781 F. 3d 11o6 (9 th Cir. 2o15);
Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 1O9 COLUM. L. R. SIDEBAR 97, 101-02
(2009).
47. 1795 Mass. Acts 436 (emphasis added). For a contemporary analysis of the statute, see 1
WILLIAM CHARLES WHITE, A COMPENDIUM AND DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 116
(1809).
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consequence of going armed.48 Blackstone wrote that "by the laws of Solon,
every Athenian was finable who walked about the city in armour," and
similarly, in England "riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual
weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of
the land."4 9 In other words, the act of traveling armed in a populated place was
sufficient under common law to constitute the offense. Accordingly, an 18o5
treatise written for justices of the peace in New Jersey made clear that peace
officers could, on their own initiative, apply this restriction to a man traveling
armed "though he may not have threatened any person in particular, or
committed any particular act of violence."' Similarly, other early American
versions of the Statute of Northampton omitted any mention of "terror."
North Carolina's statute, for example, stated that "no man great nor small
[shall] go nor ride armed by night nor day, in fairs, markets, nor in the
presence of the King's Justices, or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere."1
By its plain terms the North Carolina prohibition applied categorically,
regardless of any "intent to terrorize."
In 1836, Massachusetts revised its public carry restriction, omitting any
reference to "fear or terror" and adding a new exception for public carry in the
limited circumstances where a person had a "reasonable cause to fear an assault
or other injury, or violence to his person, or to his family or property."' 2 Under
the statute, any person publicly carrying a weapon could be arrested upon the
complaint of any other person "having reasonable cause to fear an injury, or
breach of the peace."' Defendants were permitted the opportunity to provide a
48. See 4WILLIAMBLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148-49.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. JAMES EWING, A TREATISE ON THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, SHERIFF,
CORONER, CONSTABLE, AND OF EXECUTORS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND GUARDIANS 546 (18c5).
Similarly, as early as 1682, New Jersey constables pledged "to arrest all such persons, as in
[their] presence, shall ride or go arm'd offensively." See A Bill for the Office of Coroner and
Constable, ch. 18 (Mar. 1, 1682), reprinted in AARON LEAMING &JACOB SPICER, THE GRANTS,
CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY 250, 251
(1881).
51. FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF STATUTES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN
FORCE IN THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA, 6o-61 (New Bern, Editor's Press 1792).
52. 1836 Mass. Acts 750 ("If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or
other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other
injury, or violence to his person, or to his family or property, he may, on complaint of any
person having reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace, be required to find
sureties for keeping the peace .. ").
53. 1795 Mass. Acts 436, ch. 2; see also Arrest Warrant ofBenjamin Bullock (August 13, 1853) (on
file with author). In Bullock's case, after he was arrested, a justice of the peace heard
evidence and determined that Bullock was not guilty of the offense. Record, Grover v.
Bullock (Worcester Cty. August 16, 1853) (No. 185) (on file with author). One might infer
that the lack of Wesdaw-searchable case law relating to the Massachusetts-type restrictions
is evidence that these restrictions were not enforced. But traditional case law research is not
September 25, 2015
FIREARM REGIONALISM AND PUBLIC CARRY
defense, such as proving that they reasonably had armed themselves in
response to a threat. If, after a hearing, the justice of the peace determined that
the defendant violated the statute, the defendant would be required to provide
"sureties for his keeping the Peace, '  a common enforcement tool in early
America. At common law, sureties were similar to present-day guarantors in
the bail context: members of the community who would pledge responsibility
for the defendant and risk losing their bond if the defendant failed to "keep the
peace."' In a rural society before the age of police forces or an administrative
state, this citizen-complaint process was an efficient way to deal with the
danger posed by public carrying, especially where that danger was limited
because public carry was not "engrafted" on the regional culture. 
6
The same year Massachusetts revised its law, the respected jurist Peter
Oxenbridge Thacher, whose judicial decisions and other writings "had made
him known throughout the country,"' issued a grand jury charge explaining
the restrictions on public carry in Massachusetts. He instructed that in the
Commonwealth, "no person may go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol,
or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to
apprehend an assault or violence to his person, family, or property."' 8 Judge
Thacher's charge was praised in the contemporary press as "sensible,"
especially probative of the application of these restrictions; Bullock, for example, did not
result in any published opinions and was only discovered after uncovering paper records
created by the local justices of peace. And in many cases those records did not survive the
passage of time, and those that did are not well indexed or digitally searchable. In light of
the fact that restrictions on public carry were well accepted in places like Massachusetts, see,
e.g., infra note 59 and accompanying text, and were included in the relevant manuals for
justices of the peace, see, e.g., supra notes 44, 5o and accompanying text, the better inference
is that violations were enforced at the justice of peace level, but did not result in expensive
appeals that would have produced searchable case law.
54. See 1795 Mass. Acts 436, ch. 2.
55. See 5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES w251-53 (discussing the common law practice of
providing sureties for keeping the peace). See generally RICHARD BURN, BuRN'S
ABRIDGMENT, OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE; CONTAINING THE WHOLE PRACTICE, AUTHORITY
AND DUTY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; WITH CORRECT FORMS OF PRECEDENTS RELATING
THERETO, AND ADAPTED TO THE PRESENT SITUATION OF THE UNITED STATES 386-400 (1792)
(explaining the mechanics of sureties of the peace in early American law).
56. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
57. 3 THE AMERICAN REVIEW: A WHIG JOURNAL OF POLITICS, LITERATURE, ART AND SCIENCE
222, 223 (1846) (reviewing REPORTS OF CRIMINAL CASES TRIED IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF
THE CITY OF BOSTON, BEFORE PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, JUDGE OF THAT COURT, FROM
1823 TO 1843 (Horatio Woodman ed., 1845)).
58. PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, Two CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY OF THE COUNTY OF
SUFFOLK, FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT THE OPENING OF THE TERMS OF
THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 5TH, A. D. 1836,
AND ON MONDAY, MARCH 13TH, A. D. 1837, 27 (1837); see also Charles, supra note 42, at 39 &
n.2o9; Saul Cornell, The Right to Cany Firearms Outside of the Home: Separating Historical
Mythsfrom Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695,1720 & n.134 (2012).
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"practical," and "sage."59 It lies of course in stark contrast to Chief Justice
Lumpkin's later pronouncements on the unconstitutionality of open carry
regulations.
Massachusetts was not alone in its broad regulation of public carry. Over
the next several decades, Wisconsin, Maine, Michigan, Virginia, Minnesota,
Oregon, and Pennsylvania passed laws modeled on the 1836 Massachusetts
6,
statute. While modern regulatory schemes, such as the "good cause"
59. See Judge Thacher's Charges, CHRISTIAN REG. &Bos. OBSERVER, June 1O, 1837, at 91.
6o. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
61. See An Act to Prevent the Commission of Crimes, § 16, reprinted in STATUTES OF THE
TERRITORY OF WISCONSIN 379, 381 (1839) ("If any person shall go armed with a dirk,
dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without
reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or violence to his person, or to his family,
or property, he may, on complaint of any other person having reasonable cause to fear an
injury or breach of the peace, be required to find sureties for keeping the peace for a term
not exceeding six months, with the right of appealing as before provided."); ME. REV. STAT.
ch. 169, § 16 (1840), reprinted in THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF MAINE 707, 709
(1841) ("Any person, going armed with any dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive
and dangerous weapon, without a reasonable cause to fear an assault on himself, or any of
his family or property, may, on the complaint of any person having cause to fear an injury or
breach of the peace, be required to find sureties for keeping the peace for a term, not
exceeding one year, with the right of appeal as before provided."); MICH. REV. STAT. ch.
162, § 16, reprinted in THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 690, 692 (184 6)
("If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or violence to
his person, or to his family or property, he may, on complaint of any person having
reasonable cause to fear an injury or breach of the peace, be required to find sureties for
keeping the peace, for a term not exceeding six months, with the right of appealing as before
provided."); Of Proceedings to Prevent the Commission of Crimes, ch. 14, § 16, 1847 Va.
Acts 127, 129 ("If any person shall go armed with any offensive or dangerous weapon,
without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or violence to his person, or to
his family or property, he may be required to find sureties for keeping the peace for a term
not exceeding twelve months, with the right of appealing as before provided"); Of
Proceedings to Prevent the Commission of Crimes, ch. 112, § 18, reprinted in THE REVISED
STATES OF THE TERRITORY OF MINNESOTA 526, 528 (1851) ("If any person shall go armed
with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or other offensive and dangerous weapon,
without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or violence to his person, or to his
family, or property, he may, on complaint of any other person having reasonable cause to
fear an injury or breach of the peace, be required to find sureties for keeping the peace, for a
term not exceeding six months, with the right of appealing as before provided.");
Proceedings to Prevent Commission of Crimes, ch. 16, § 17 (1853), reprinted in THE
STATUTES OF OREGON 218, 220 (1854) ("If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger,
sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an
assault, injury, or other violence to his person, or to his family or property, he may, on
complaint of any other person, having reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the
peace, be required to find sureties for keeping the peace for a term not exceeding six
months, with the right of appealing as before provided."); Proceedings to Detect the
Commission of Crimes, § 6 (1861), reprinted in A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA
24 8 , 25o (John Purdon comp., 1862) ("If any person, not being an officer on duty in the
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permitting policy at issue in Peruta, do not operate in exactly the same manner
as these regulations passed primarily outside the South in the nineteenth
century, they are a logical analogue given present-day circumstances.
Significantly, both regimes presume that the state's police power justifies
limiting the right to carry arms in public to circumstances in which there is a
clear justification, such as a heightened need for self-defense.62
After the Civil War, the Massachusetts model -generally restricting public
carry with limited exceptions for people with reasonable cause to fear attack-
gained traction in parts of the South. One of the fullest judicial expositions of
the scope of this regulatory model occurred after Texas enacted a statute that
reflected the Massachusetts one, titled, "Act to regulate the keeping and
bearing of deadly weapons., 6' The Texas law prohibited "[a] ny person [from]
carrying on or about his person" pistols, knives, and other specified weapons.64
The Act provided an affirmative defense if a defendant could show that he or
she faced an "immediate and pressing" danger that would "alarm a person of
ordinary courage., 6' In State v. Duke, the Texas Supreme Court upheld this
statute as "a legitimate and highly proper regulation" that "appears to have
respected the right to carry a pistol openly when needed for self-defense or in
the public service, and the right to have one at the home or place of
business.
66
military or naval service of the state or of the United States shall go armed with a dirk,
dagger, sword or pistol, or other offensive or dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause
to fear an assault or other injury or violence to his family, person or property, he may, on
complaint of any person having reasonable cause to fear a breach of the peace therefrom, be
required to find surety of the peace as aforesaid.").
62. Research into public carry restrictions contrary to the Nunn regime only recently received
attention in academic literature. See Cornell, supra note 58, at 1720 & n.134. Moreover, the
substance of this research was not referenced in briefs submitted to the Ninth Circuit before
the original Peruta decision was filed. Only after the Court voted to rehear the case en banc
and called for additional briefs, over a year after the initial Peruta decision, did an amicns
brief discuss this new historical research. See Brief for Everytown for Gun Safety as Amicns
Curiae Supporting Appellees at 15-17, Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 1o-56971 (9 th Cir.
Apr. 30, 2o1), ECF No. 257.
63. Law ofApril 12, 1871, ch. 34, § 1, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws 25, reprinted in 6 H. GAMMEL, LAWs OF
TEXAS 927 (1898). For a compilation of other state statutes restricting carrying weapons in
public, see Marl Frassetto, Firearms and Weapons Legislation up to the Early Twentieth Century
(Jan. 15, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract-22oo991 [http://perma.cc/QB 4 3 -SFLU].
64. Law of April 12, 1871, in GAMMEL, supra note 63, at 927.
65. Id.
66. State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 459 (1874). The Peruta majority rejected Duke because the Texas
constitution made express what has always been implicit in the state police power: that the
right to bear arms could be limited by "such regulations as the legislature may prescribe."
Peruta, 742 F. 3 d at 116o (quoting Texas Constitution of 1869) (alteration omitted).
Regulation of firearms and gunpowder has been at the heart of the police power throughout
our nation's history. See WILLIAM J. NOVAi, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 53-54 (1996) (describing the scope of police power in
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Meanwhile, outside both the South and North, frontier towns adopted
public carry regulations by the era of the Fourteenth Amendment that were far
stricter than even those in Massachusetts and Texas. 6' Desiring to reduce
violence and attract businessmen who might not invest in places where they
felt endangered, many frontier towns prohibited public carry altogether.68
Even famed "wild west" places like Tombstone and Dodge City banned
carrying firearms within town limits.
6 9
Thus, it appears that much of the country did not share Nunn's view that
broad regulation of public carry ran afoul of the right to bear arms. Most
regions, and parts of the South itself, were amenable to substantial restrictions
on public carry rights in the interest of public safety, restrictions that were
reflected in statutes, the press, grand jury charges, and Reconstruction-era
opinions such as Duke.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, courts have been asked to strike down public carry
restrictions on the basis of the original understanding of the Second
Amendment. If the judges deciding those cases choose to look to history, they
should keep in mind that diverse regional understandings of the right to carry
firearms have persisted throughout our nation's history. While Nunn
represents one perspective on the constitutionality of public carry restrictions,
it falls woefully short of reflecting a national consensus. Indeed, the value of
cases like Nunn is greatly diminished by the fact that a great many Americans
in the antebellum years lived outside the South, in places less enthusiastic
early America and how "it was never doubted in this well-regulated society that something
as potentially injurious to the public as gun powder.., was decidedly regulatable"); id. at 57
(noting exercise of police power in 1813 to prohibit the discharge of firearms in New York
City); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 683-84 (2oo8) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (compiling early gunpowder and firearm laws). Moreover, the textual
distinction between the Texas Constitution as it was interpreted in Duke and the Second
Amendment is not as clear as Peruta makes it out to be. See Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits
of Second Amendment Originalism and the Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2o15) (arguing that, in light of Heller's definition of "militia" as
including "the body of all citizens capable of military service," the reference to a "well
regulated Militia" in the Second Amendment's preamble is a textual authorization of
firearms regulation).
67. See Blocher, supra note ii, at 117-18 (describing severe firearms restrictions in Western
towns within the broader American tradition of more restrictive firearms regulations in
American population centers).
68. ADAM WINKLER, GUN FIGHT 171-73 (2011).
69. See ROBERT R. DYKSTRA, THE CATTLE TOWNS (1983); WINKLER, supra note 68, at 13, 163-65
(summarizing historical research such as Dykstra's showing that carrying dangerous
weapons was "nearly always proscribed" in frontier towns).
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about public carry and more accepting of public carry restrictions. Rather than
relying on regional case law derived from the antebellum South, whose gun
culture and jurisprudence were influenced by the culture of slavery and honor,
judges seeking historical guidance in public carry cases today can and should
seek guidance from the alternative tradition that presumed the constitutional
soundness of broad public carry restrictions. At a minimum, persuasive
historical precedent exists for a view of the Second Amendment that
accommodates modem "good cause" permitting schemes requiring applicants
to show a heightened need for self-defense in order to carry handguns in
public.
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